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Introduction 
 
 China's relationship with Southeast Asia has undergone serious reevaluation in 
the past twenty years, both in terms of how we perceive the history of that relationship 
(Hamashita 1997, Sun 2000) and in terms of how our changing understanding of that 
relationship requires adjusting how we understand Southeast Asia as a region and as an 
accurate unit of analysis  (Liu 2000). For historians, the record of official state relations 
was once the nearly sole focus of the study of the relationship between China and 
Southeast Asia. The historiography is balancing out significantly due to efforts to 
understand the roles and history of Overseas Chinese who settled in Southeast Asia 
throughout the early modern and colonial periods (Blusse 1986), as well as in the present 
(McKeown 1999). We also know more about the overall sub-regional groups of Chinese 
and their merchant activities in Southeastern China (Ng 1983) and Overseas (Wang 1990 
& 1996). Although this paper focuses specifically upon the Chinese in Burma, it is in the 
                                                
1 The author has benefited considerably from conversations with Hong Liu, Takeshi Hamashita, Laichen 
Sun, James Chin Kong, and Atsuko Naono concerning the Overseas Chinese in Burma. Comments made 
by various scholars during the presentation of a related paper, "The External and Internal Sides of Chinese-
ness: Colonial Historiography and the  'Overseas Chinese' in Burma," delivered as an EAI lecture on 29 
September 2000,  have also proved invaluable.  
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context of a broader regional perspective and suggests that these issues are of relevance 
to understanding the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia as a whole.2 
Furthermore, this paper is concerned chiefly with Burmese and European 
accounts of the Chinese in Burma, in part because the Chinese sources have received 
thorough attention by scholars well-versed in the Chinese-language literature (for a 
survey of this literature, see Huber 1909, 662-680; Stargadt 1971, 38-62; and Sun 1997). 
And, with a few exceptions (Zhu c.1584), this literature tells us little of the actual 
activities of Chinese resident in most of Burma during this period (with the exception of 
northeastern Burma). Most importantly, however, it will be one contention of this paper 
that the acceptance of state documentation and state-centred historical narratives, such as 
the bulk of Chinese-language sources, as providing the authoritative historical narrative 
of the Chinese in Burma has led to a misunderstanding of their identity and place in 
Burmese history for the last several centuries (especially the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries). 
 As Prasenjit Duara has explained, in his analysis of the first half of the twentieth 
century in Chinese history, there is a tension between local, regional, and state-centred 
historical narratives that should be identified and kept in mind when one studies a 
country's history (Duara 1995). There has not been, however, a significant effort in this 
direction in the prevailing historiography on Burma and of the sub-national Chinese  
migrant groups and their histories in Burma remain largely ignored. This is starting to 
change, specifically for the Burma's postwar history, but to a far lesser extent for the 
many centuries of migration from China into Burma prior to the Second World War. 
Hokkien, Gwangdong, Hakka, Teochew, and other migrants from China (especially the 
Southeastern maritime provinces) in Burma have been viewed in the secondary literature 
as Chinese nationals, rather than as different ethnic or sub-ethnic groups. This inability to 
separate people and their history from the nation-state paradigm continues (Charney 
1999). 
 
I 
                                                
2 This perspective was strongly encouraged during the author's postgraduate education in seminars with Bill 
Frederick (Ohio), Vic Lieberman (Michigan), and John Whitmore (Michigan). 
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Chinese Migrants in Precolonial Burma: an Indigenous State-centred Perspective 
 
The Kingdom of Burma's historical relationship with the Empire of China was 
framed by China's longstanding tribute system. The Chinese tribute system governed the 
celestial empire's relationship with the small petty states along the rim of the middle 
kingdom. Yearly royal tribute missions were sent from Southeast Asian courts to Peking 
and regalia and imperial charter granting sovereignty to Southeast Asian rulers, 
sometimes with a Chinese "princess" to boot, were provided in return. Failure to pay 
tribute, or the usurpation of the throne of a local ruler tributary to the China sometimes 
led to a imperial punitive mission. Over the course of the thirteenth to late eighteenth 
centuries, Burma was invaded by Chinese armies many times for similar reasons.3 
The tribute-system and Chinese-Burmese state relations also had an important 
impact on Burmese perceptions of Chinese migrants in Burma. One side of the Burmese 
state-centred perspective was that Chinese migrants consisted of one homogenous 
migrant group. The Burmese state-centred view, for example, was that the Chinese were 
subjects of the Empire of China, with a single and united political identity. This view 
holds that the Chinese were a single people, called "Tayoub" by the Burmese, or at least 
could be identified as such. This perspective is to be found in texts composed in the 
Burmese court or based upon Burmese royal court records.  One reason for the Burmese 
state-centred perspective of the Chinese as one group, is that the Burmese court probably 
saw identities in terms of political relationships.  
These relationships were reflected in several ways. First, the subjects of the 
Chinese empire were all Chinese in the same way that the direct subjects of the Burman 
court were Burman and all the subjects of the Talaing court were Talaing (Lieberman 
1978). Second, the Burmese court and its ministers were regularly visited by Chinese 
embassies and, in wartime, Burmese warriors and commanders fought Chinese armies 
and commanders. All Chinese state relations with Burma were overland, between 
                                                
3The longstanding importance of the tribute-system gave the Burmese and Chinese an intimacy 
that Europeans lacked in their relationships with the Burmese court during a later period. When Michael 
Symes visited the Burmese court in 1795, a Chinese imperial mission had arrived in that court on the same 
day and was told by the Burmese that their relationship with the Chinese was much more cordial than that 
with the English. Symes also noted that some Burmese officials could converse with the Chinese envoys in 
Chinese (Symes 1800).  
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Yunnan and northeastern Burma, the same quarter that saw all of the warfare between the 
Chinese Empire and the Kingdom of Burma. Hence, the Burmese saw the Chinese as a 
inland people and not a people who would come by sea. Some Chinese in royal Burma, 
for example, were war captives who were deported away from the Chinese border to the 
southern coast. This was in converse to the arrangement of Western captives who were 
typically deported away from the coasts, far into the interior (in a manner similar to the 
Roman policy of stationing legionnaires at posts far away from their home provinces). 
Although it is unclear in which campaign they were taken, many of the Chinese in 
Rangoon at the time of the outbreak of the Anglo-Burmese War appear to have been war 
captive deportees, being placed at Rangoon "to work, and to increase the population" 
(Maw 1832, 88). This also suggests a Burmese view of Chinese as an overland, not an 
overseas people. Additionally, after the mid-fifteenth century, Chinese migrants to 
Southeast Asia were often in disregard of the ban on going overseas and hence ignored 
by the Chinese empire as illegals.  
For the precolonial period, Burmese historiography has been dependent upon the 
state-centred historical perspective. The available Burmese accounts are also generally 
court-centred, consisting of royal chronicles based upon materials in royal libraries, royal 
orders (amein-daw), local official reports (sittans), and, although numerous, records of 
commercial transactions (thekkarits), are very limited in scope and time. These 
documents and historical narratives focus almost exclusively, in regard to the Chinese, 
upon state relations. Furthermore, Burmese-language histories prior to the twentieth 
century rarely shed light on the activities of Chinese migrants in Burma, indicating a 
general absence of interest in Chinese migrants themselves (save only for when they were 
involved in events related to state activities). These materials thus shed little light on any 
Chinese migrant activities in Burma aside from those involving the Burmese state. This 
Burmese court perspective on the Chinese of both Lower and Upper Burma, both local 
and non-local, as forming one "Tayoub" or "Chinese" group has also had a great impact 
on colonial and post-colonial historiography as historians of Burma have  depended upon 
these written materials as important indigenous sources.  
 Likewise, in the Burmese sources, Burma's relationship with China dictated the 
coverage of Chinese ethnic and migrant activities in Burma. In Burmese chronicles, for 
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example, at least those written before the twentieth century, the Chinese were included in 
the state-centred historical narratives only when the state of China was involved. In the 
eighteenth century, we are told, the problems of one Chinese merchant on the Burmese 
Chinese border led to a Chinese invasion. Little information is available at all, however, 
for the Chinese active in Lower Burma, at least until the 1820s.  Similarly, other Burmese 
texts on the Burmese and Chinese relationship were authored by Burmese court ministers 
unable to escape from the state-centred perspective. The minister who composed the 
Tayoub-than Yauk Mawgun in the early nineteenth century, for example, chiefly 
examined the arrivals of Chinese embassies at the Burmese court, not the range of 
Chinese migrant activities in Burma. 
 
II 
The Early Colonial Perspective 
 
In the early days of British interaction with Burma, just prior to the extension of 
British rule to two of Burma's maritime provinces (Arakan and Tenasserim) in 1826, the 
British also viewed the Chinese in Burma as representatives of Chinese trade and 
economic connectivities in Upper Burma. British accounts of the Chinese in Burma in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were chiefly concerned with the role of 
Chinese merchants in Burma, their imports and exports, and how they carried out the 
trade (Gouger [1826]: 222). Michael Symes in 1795 (Symes 1800) and Hiram Cox in 
1800 (Cox 1821) may have disagreed on the nature of the Burmese court, but they agreed 
on the rich potential of Burmese overland trade connections with China. These and later 
accounts by Henry Gouger (1826) and John Laird (1926) created an early basis for the 
British framing of the Chinese relationship with Burma.  
These accounts chiefly sought to answer the most important questions of British 
company's and officials: what products did the Chinese buy and sell, how frequently, how 
many merchants were involved, what routes did they take, and, implicitly, how could one 
tap this resource and gain access to the inland western China market? The interrogation 
of the Henry Gouger before Henry Crawfurd at the close of the First Anglo-Burmese War 
(1824-1826), for example, reveals John Crawfurd's (and that of Company authorities) 
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deep and almost exclusive interest in the intermediary merchant role played by the 
Chinese in the Yunnan border, not in the Lower Burma. For Crawfurd and others, this 
was the much envied "inland trade" of Burma with China. As with Gouger, John Laird 
was also asked about Burma's trade with China: "Do you know any thing of the trade 
carried on between the northern parts of the Burman dominions and China?" (Laird 
[1826]: 226).Although some British surveys of Upper Burma's trade during 1826 also 
provided additional information on the activities of Chinese living in Upper Burma, this 
information also focused exclusively upon their commercial activities.4 
Despite preceding and later trends, British documents on Tenasserim in the latter 
part of the 1820s reveal a view of the local Chinese of Lower Burma as being divided 
into tribes, much as the British perceived Chinese communities in the Straits.5  It is 
probably the case that the early British colonial perceptions of different Chinese "tribes" 
in Tenasserim came from the Chinese migrants themselves. Many of these migrants 
played with different identities: relying on Gwangdong, Hokkien, Tieochew, or other 
sub-Chinese identities among other Chinese while portraying themselves as Chinese to 
Europeans and others. If this was the case, however, why did British perceptions change 
over the course of the nineteenth century, very noticeably from the 1830s?6   
                                                
4 Gouger's and Laird's image of the Chinese trader was as a small merchant, one of only hundreds, 
who came in the yearly caravan "on man to about thirty horses, or mules" (Gouger [1826], p. 223; Laird 
[1826: 227)). These caravans took about two months to travel from China to Ava (Laird [1826]: 227). 
5 The British view of the Chinese in the Straits tended to reflect more of a local perspective 
toward the Chinese in the area. The censuses for Chinese in the Straits Settlements, including Penang, 
Singapore, Melaka, and Province Wellesley, for example, always included a major chart breaking up the 
Chinese into different Chinese "tribes." These tribes also included the "Baba Chinese," referring to the 
children of Chinese who had intermarried with Malays. First-hand accounts also reveal the critical place of 
Chinese dialect divisions in external perceptions of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements. These 
perceptions pervade the contemporaneous documents, from the Straits Settlements Records to the Hearings 
in 1867 regarding the Penang Riots of the same year, and beyond.5 These were not the simple observations 
of foreigners who mistook what they saw. The well-known 1848 account of the Chinese in Singapore, 
provided as answers to questions by Siah U Chin, for example, indicated the same kinds of divisions, also 
referred to the Chinese groups as "tribes." After referring to six chief "tribes," including the Hokkien, the 
Baba, the Teochew, the Gwangdong, the Khe, and the Hainanese, he explains,  "[e]ach individual tribe 
speaks the dialect of that tribe" (p. 283). 
6 Differences between colonial perspectives on the Chinese in Burma between the 1820s and early 
1840s cannot be explained by the existence of different colonial administrative groups. The British 
occupied Tenasserim in 1824 and formally annexed it in 1826. Although the Straits Settlements were 
originally placed under the authority of Calcutta and the new British acquisitions in Burma were placed in 
turn under the Straits Settlements, British colonial officials assigned to Burma were not chiefly drawn, as 
might be assumed, from British administrators and officers from India. Until 1843, the principal colonial 
administrators in Tenasserim were drawn from a generation of British colonial officials who had cut their 
teeth in Penang in the context of Straits Settlements society. This first generation of colonial administrators 
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British perspectives of the Chinese in Burma adjusted to the need for Chinese 
settlement in British Tenasserim. In the 1820s and early 1830s, British views of the 
Chinese in Tenasserim were influenced more heavily by local economic concerns. With 
low population reserves, its landscape historically ravaged by war, and an economy 
poorly suited for growing world markets, the British actually considered giving 
Tenasserim back to the Burmese. Certainly, this economic context had an influence on 
British perceptions of the Chinese in the area. Colonial documents and perspectives, for 
example, played with the presence of Chinese in Tenasserim, sometimes admitting they 
were there, and other times pretending or imagining that the Chinese were not already 
there (Charney 1999). 
At first, it also looked like new developments involving Chinese migrants in 
Burma would help the development of a strong economy in British-held areas of Lower 
Burma. For many Chinese, particularly the Chinese of Penang, for example, the extension 
of British control into Lower Burma during the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) 
represented an unprecedented economic opportunity. At issue were the old Burmese royal 
restrictions on trade, and British regiments occupying Rangoon and other key Lower 
Burmese towns opened up new trade possibilities.  Most of the immediate opportunities, 
however, were directly linked to the British regiments themselves. British soldiers, 
unused to life in Burma, were good customers for familiar foods and wares. After the 
British had occupied Rangoon for some time (circa 1825), Captain F. B. Doveton 
recalled: 
 
". . . a most refreshing cup of tea and a most delicious piece of bread fell 
to my share. This luxury had just been introduced into Rangoon, through 
the agency of some enterprising Chinese, if I remember rightly, to whom, 
by the way, we were indebted for many of the supplies and comforts that 
latterly flowed in upon us so abundantly. Some thousands of Chinese 
were, after a time, located in the town, having come mostly from Penang. 
These brought over with them, in their junks, pigs, poultry, vegetables and 
                                                                                                                                            
likely carried their impressions of the Chinese in the Straits into Tenasserim in the early decades of British 
administration. After 1843, the chief British colonial officials in Tenasserim were drawn from the Bengal 
military and civil establishments.   
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tea and sugar, in abundance. the pork-butchers in particular, carried on a 
most flourishing trade, there being ever a great demand for pork chops and 
sausages; and many of these gentry, doubtless, amassed considerable 
sums, as they well deserved, by their industry and enterprise, in the 
exercise of which attributes, as far at least as relates to commerce, the 
Chinese have no superiors" (Doveton, 1852, pp. 227-228). 
  
This episode bode well for the activities of the Chinese of Penang in Lower Burma, 
especially in Rangoon. It was to be a short-lived development, however, as the British 
withdrew from the Lower Burma delta at the close of the First Anglo-Burmese War and 
Burmese royal rule was re-extended over Rangoon and other coastal towns. 
It also appeared that Tenasserim would benefit from problems for the Chinese in 
Rangoon, brought about by the return of Burmese rule to central Lower Burma after the 
Treaty of Yandabo (1826). The Burmese who returned after the British withdrawal took 
out their anger on the Chinese for several reasons. First, when the Burmese had first 
evacuated the city, some Chinese in the city had engaged in looting and hoarding: "[The 
Chinese there] were amongst the greatest rogues in existence. Plunder being prohibited to 
the British forces, the Chinese carried off every thing in the Burmans' absence. Their 
houses were full of all kinds of commodities, and I believe they were the only people 
who had abundance" (Maw 1832, 88-89). Second, the Chinese had carried on business as 
usual when Mon rebels briefly held the town after the British had evacuated. Those 
Chinese who remained when the Burmese won back the city did not fare well: 
 
"[A]mong the prisoners there were some Chinese, who were sold by the 
captors on the spot to the highest bidder. These had not served the Talains 
[Mons] nor were they taken in arms. They had not, however, quitted the 
suburbs where their dwellings were, when the Burmans returned to the 
stockade, which was considered suspicious, and thus, was an offence which 
merited punishment" (Crawfurd 1834, 2.41). 
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Even then, the Mon rebellion had left Tatgale in ruins (Crawfurd 1834, 2.39).7  Indeed, in 
these circumstances, many Chinese migrants in Lower Burma did flee to neighbouring 
British-held areas such as Tenasserim. 
Further, British rule was extended to Tenasserim at a time when economic growth 
in the Straits spurred the large-scale immigration of Southeastern Chinese and this 
migration pushed northward into Burma. The 1820s and 1830s saw especially large (but 
not the first) Southeastern Chinese migrations out of Fujian and Gwangdong and into the 
Straits of Melaka. What I have found in my research, looking at local historical narratives 
and local perspectives is that there was a continuity of Chinese migration from Southeast 
China around the Straits and into Lower Burma. Coastal Burma and the Straits thus 
formed a single zone for the Chinese themselves. A detailed examination of the 
contemporaneous sources, for example, indicates that this migration pushed further north 
from the Straits of Melaka into Southeastern Burma and reached Bassein by the mid-
1820s (Anonymous 1827a, xlv), just as sustained Burman southern migration moved into 
the same area. Chinese immigration into Burma was part of overall Chinese immigration 
into the Straits of Melaka in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
The flow of Chinese migrants into Lower Burma from the Straits, helped to 
dramatically increase the presence of specifically Southeastern Chinese. By the 1830s, 
Chinese merchants had settled as far up the coast as Akyab in western Burma (Malcom 
1840, 118; Spry 1841, p. 144). As one observer noted in 1901: 
 
The Chinese used to come to Bamaw from Yunnan by way of Momeit, 
which was the route followed both by trade and by invading armies, at the 
terminus of which Chinese have been settled for long. But they have not 
spread in Burma from that centre. The peaceable invasion of Chinese 
comes by way of Canton [Gwangdong], Singapore, and the Burmese ports 
(Ferrars 1901, 156).8 
                                                
7 As late as 1833, Tatgale had still not recovered. Ultimately, a fire in 27 March 1842 fire destroyed what 
remained of the Chinese quarter in Tatgale (Pearn 1939, 133, 156). 
 
8 The earlier years of this "peaceable invasion" by the Overseas Chinese into Lower Burma (as 
opposed to the Overland Chinese in Upper Burma) and its role in the emergence of the 'Chinese of Burma' 
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Teochew, Hokkien, Gwangdong, Hakka, and other migrant groups settled throughout this 
zone, comprising coastal Burma and the coastal lands of the Straits. Throughout the 
Straits and coastal Burma, Chinese merchants, city laborers, tin-miners and others 
organized around clan and dialect associations. Often these Chinese migrants would 
move around freely throughout this zone during their lifetimes, so that one Chinese 
migrant might spend part of his life in Singapore, then part of his life in Rangoon, and 
ultimately spend the remainder of his life in Penang. Most Chinese families in Rangoon, 
for example, had some family relationship with Chinese in Penang, just as in the familiar 
cases of Penang and Singapore's family interrelationships. It was even considered at one 
time that British Burma and the Straits should together form one British colony, given 
their similarities, but this was not to be the case (Rangoon Gazette). 
The early British administrators used the Chinese communities in Tenasserim in 
two ways. (1) On the one hand, De Maingy and others kept up hopes that Tenasserim  
would be prosperous once Chinese immigration into the area had begun. British 
documents from Tenasserim during this period, especially those lamenting Tenasserim's 
poor economic performance, for example, suggest that the arrival of Chinese in 
Tenasserim was either begun under British rule, would eventually begin under British 
rule, or was as yet insufficient to keep the economy going.9 This is in sharp contrast, 
however, to the non-British sources (and even some British ones) that indicate a long-
term and significant Chinese role in Tenasserim's maritime economy.10  (2) On the other 
                                                                                                                                            
has only recently begun to be given greater consideration in the literature (Charney 1999a; Charney 1999b; 
Charney 2000b). 
9 In 1826, for example, Maingy wrote to the Governor of Prince of Wales Island explaining why 
he had failed to begin exporting significant supplies of tin: "My expectations respecting the produce of the 
Tin Mines have not been realized owing to the want of Chinese laborers, and the few that have been 
employed, having suffered from Fever are unwilling to return to the Mines until the setting in of the N.E. 
Monsoon "  (p. 43). 
10 In a recent article (Charney 2001b), I discussed the Cochin-Chinese embassy of 1821-1822 to 
Burma that was sent by a provincial Vietnamese governor who hoped to gain access to Tenasserim's 
esculent birds' nests so that he could sell them in China where they were in high demand and he would 
make a great profit. Nothing came of the mission, aside from a few exchanges back and forth between 
Burma and Vietnam. Certainly, nothing was resolved by 1824 when a follow-up Vietnamese mission was 
given a free ride to Rangoon aboard British warships on their way to invade Lower Burma. This episode is 
important to us here because the return mission to Vietnam in 1822 included, in addition to Burmese 
ministers, a British shahbandar of Rangoon, in Burmese employ, and a Chinese merchant of Penang who 
controlled the Tenasserim esculent birds' nest farm in the name of the King of Burma. In the contemporary 
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hand, and in contradictory fashion, these same British colonial officials blamed the 
Chinese for all their failures in Tenasserim during the same period. At the same time that 
British administrators pointed to the absence of Chinese in Tenasserim, some British 
officials, and sometimes the same officials, blamed Tenasserim's problems on a Chinese 
community that suddenly did exist in Tenasserim. In other words, when the British were 
focused upon Tenasserim itself, in this case in the hopes of developing Tenasserim's 
colonial economy, they stressed the local context, in which case the Chinese were a 
convenient scapegoat for the failures of these same colonial officials.11 Even when 
evidence of Chinese syndicates was not available, Maingy still found ways to point his 
finger directly at the Chinese for the economic failures of the colony.12  
                                                                                                                                            
Burmese, Vietnamese and British documents of this event, the British documents emphasize the supposedly 
pivotal role played by the Englishman, but make no reference at all to the presence of the Chinese 
merchant. The Burmese and the Vietnamese documents, however, do mention this Chinese merchant and 
the Burmese sources explicitly state that he was Chinese. Similarly, the Burmese and Vietnamese accounts 
make no mention of the Englishman. Thus, for unclear reasons, the British ignored the intermediary role of 
the Chinese in the Burmese and Vietnamese relationship, by contrast to indigenous sources. But this 
episode is also important because it indicates a phenomenon that is gradually being re-pieced together from 
indigenous and some European sources: the Chinese, especially those with connections to Penang, were 
playing a critical role in the Southeastern Burmese economy long before, and during, the opening years of 
British rule in Tenasserim. Ultimately, some of the early monopolies farmed out in Tavoy (such as those 
for opium and gambling) were sometimes taken over under the colonial state's direct management due to 
the disagreements between Maingy and the Chinese of Tavoy (Maingy 1826a, p. 37, Maingy 1826c, p. 40, 
Maingy 1826d, p. 43). 
11 Maingy, for example, focused attention on local Chinese in the context of the sale of the birds' 
nest, opium, and gambling farms. Maingy spread the word that the local Chinese had grouped together in 
order to drive down prices and improve the terms of sale. Maingy, of course, adopted various strategies to 
improve the British position in these sales and the management of the farms but  generally failed (Maingy 
1825b, p. 28; Maingy 1826a, p. 37). As Maingy explained in 1826: "I regret to report that the same 
combination that prevailed among the Chinese farmers during your stay here has continued and that I have 
found it impossible to rent the farms upon the system you directed to be pursued that of dividing each farm 
into a certain number of shares and licenses. Several attempts have been made to dispose of the two that 
remain unsold but not a bidder for them was to be found excepting at rates I would not listen to. . . 
Lieutenant Briggs states the combination among the Chinese at Mergui as being even greater than it is here 
. . . [T]he Propensity to combination, exclusion of others and spirit of monopoly which characterizes the 
Chinese must therefore be guarded against at the outset, and it would certainly be adviseable that the great 
proportion of workers at the mines should consist of our Burmese inhabitants[,] the temporary employment 
of Chinese workmen as the most ready and expert might indeed be convenient at present [,] but Temporary 
convenience would be dearly purchased in the certain result that we must ever after depend on expensive 
foreign labour instead of the cheaper work of our own natural subject" (Maingy 1826a, p. 37-38). 
12 As Maingy reported in 1833: "One cause of this failure is, I think, [is] to be attributed to the 
circumstances of none but poor and insolvent Chinese having hitherto engaged in working the tin mines " 
(Maingy 1833, p. 104).  
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There is a connection between the importance of the locality and locally relevant 
historical narratives and perspectives for the British during this period and their 
perceptions of the local Chinese in Burma. The British shifted between local and non-
local  perspectives when it suited their economic interests and, in reference to the Chinese 
in Tenasserim,  British colonial officials moved back and forth between silence and 
finger-pointing when it was convenient to do so. Whether there or not, in the minds of 
British colonial administrators in Tenasserim, the Chinese were seen as the key to a 
potential economic miracle in Tenasserim or as a scapegoat for colonial failures. With 
lenses focussed upon the Chinese communities in coastal Burma, at least during this 
moment, their heterogeneity became visible to colonial officials as the local narrative 
became relevant to the state-centred one. 
 British accounts of the Chinese in Tenasserim during this period sound strangely 
like British documents on the Chinese in Penang and Singapore. In Maingy's report of  22 
October 1825, for example, he explained that he had postponed selling off the esculent 
bird's nest farm in the Tavoy islands out of suspicion of the eagerness of the Gwangdong 
Chinese from Rangoon to buy it, apparently having some reason to distrust the 
Gwangdong over other Chinese "tribes." Maingy, of course, referred to them, as did 
British colonial administrators of the period in the Straits, not as Gwangdong but as 
Macao Chinese (p. 29). Part of the reason may have been that Maingy wanted to avoid 
inter-group conflict between the Chinese so early in his administration of the province, 
even before political stability or economic viability had been assured. As Maingy 
explained, regarding the farm for esculent bird's nests in the Tavoy islands and the 
Mergui islands:  "It has been the custom not to dispose of the farms separately and the 
Chinese here, being all of the same tribe, no competition for them has taken place . . . " 
(p. 28). Apparently, all were of the same "tribe" the Chinese in this case were probably 
Hokkien, one of the two chief Chinese dialect groups in Lower Burma, as suggested by 
Maingy's fear that selling one farm to the Gwangdung would have stirred things up. 
Maingy also hints here how relevant dialect groups were for colonial administrators 
concerned with Tenasserim per se, as both the functioning of the farms and keeping 
domestic peace required taking into account dialect affiliations and treating such matters 
with delicacy.  
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In short, after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826), British colonial 
administrators were saddled with a large colony of little clear economic value that was 
only important for strategic reasons. Being unprofitable, the British were concerned that 
it would be an excessive drain on their resources. For some time, the British seriously 
considered giving Tenasserim back to the Burmese or giving it to Thailand. Thus, 
economically, the British were specifically interested for several years solely in making 
the colony self-sufficient. As a result, local colonial officials in Tenasserim were chiefly 
concerned with the locality. In this context, divisions among the Chinese became very 
visible to colonial officials because these divisions had a very important impact on the 
colonial state's prospects for building Tenasserim's economy. Thus, for this period, the 
local narrative was emphasized in British documents. 
In the 1830s, British perceptions of the Chinese began to change again. In the face 
of Tenasserim's poor economic outlook, an idea gradually emerged in the minds of the 
British administrators of Lower Burma that Southwest China was their saving economic 
connection for their new Province of Tenasserim. Since, as I have mentioned, early 
British attempts to develop the economy failed, in the 1830s, a series of missions were 
sponsored to help link up the colony with Chinese caravan trade coming out of Yunnan. 
The first of these exploratory missions was that of a certain Dr. Richardson who made 
two long journeys from Moulmein, one in 1829-1830 and another in 1834, up to the Shan 
states in the hopes of contacting Chinese caravans moving through the area and 
attempting to divert them in the future to Tenasserim.13 The missions did not become 
important enough to publicize until Second British Commissioner for Tenasserim, 
Edmund Augustus Blundell, had the diaries and journals from Richardson's journeys 
published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1836. Even then, 
however, they had not yet been a success.14 It should be stressed that at this time, 
exploiting resources from or expanding into the areas visited by Richardson north of 
                                                
13 Richardson related his sentiments in his diary made en route in early 1830: "A Chinese who is 
here . . . is to start to-morrow for Zimmay, to bring up some of the principal Chinese traders said to have 
arrived there, and I have strong hopes, from the enterprizing character of the Chinese, they may induced to 
visit the [Tenasserim] coast" (p. 619). 
14 As Blundell explained, in 1836: "It is expected that a portion of this caravan will this year 
extend their journey to Maulamyne, and hopes are entertained that this will lead to annual visits in 
increasing numbers, and the opening of an important overland trade between China and our possessions on 
the Tenasserim coast " (p. 604). 
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Tenasserim were not important for local British administrators.15 What was important, 
was how to get commerce going between Chinese markets and Tenasserim and thus 
stimulate economic growth. A small number of Chinese merchants from the north did 
travel to Tenasserim in 1836 which helped to convince the British that they needed to 
redouble their efforts. Thus, in 1836-37, another mission was sent out, this time under 
Lieutenant T. E. MacLeod, Assistant Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces. Unlike 
Richardson's missions, MacLeod pushed up past the Shan states and up to the border of 
the Kingdom of Burma with China. 16 
From this point on, British colonial perceptions of the Chinese in Burma and the 
Straits underwent a slow but dramatic bifurcation. While British colonial officials in 
Penang and Singapore continued to  stress fragmented Chinese communities in their 
colonies, British colonial officials in Burma moved away from early discourse on the 
fragmented Chinese tribes of Lower Burma. In part this was because the British 
administrators in Tenasserim were now looking for a non-local solution to Tenasserim's 
economic problem and their attention moved away from local perspectives. As their view 
broadened, their attention no longer concentrated on the internal divisions of the Chinese 
in Tenasserim, who, in British colonial eyes, had together failed to save Tenasserim 
economically, and instead British colonial officials focused on developing connections 
that linked China and its markets to Tenasserim. There was thus a strong incentive to see 
local Chinese in an overall "Chinese" context. 
Early British historiography on Burma was strongly committed to Chinese-
Burmese relations to the neglect of other aspects of Burmese history. The interest here is 
unmistakable as no full-fledged British historiography on Burma emerged until the 
1860s, with the publication of Arthur Phayre's historical surveys, which together formed 
the basis for his classic 1889 study. Henry Burney, for example, translated large extracts 
from the Burmese royal chronicles that dealt with the history of China-Burma relations, 
                                                
15 Blundell's comments imply a lack of any interest in the area between China and Tenasserim 
itself on the part of the colonial administration of Tenasserim:  [quote] [t]he trade of the country [visited by 
Richardson] is unimportant." (p. 604).  
16MacLeod excitedly reported the prospects of opening up increased trade: "These [Chinese] 
merchants informed me that they were most anxious to carry on a brisk trade with our provinces, and that 
the market was most satisfactory, but that the road travelled by those who visited us in 1836 was such as to 
render it impracticable for them to come visit by it. This objection I am happy to say can be easily 
overcome by their taking the road travelled by me on my return here from Zumue." (p. 992). 
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and these were published in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in the mid-
nineteenth century. British perceptions of and historiography on the Chinese in Burma, 
then, was at first a continuation, or better put, paralleled that of the Burman court. Just as 
Burma's state documentation and royally-sponsored chronicles focused on state relations 
between Burma and China, British state documentation and historiography on the 
Chinese in Burma focused on their single national identity due to considerations of the 
importance of China in the interests of British Burma.   
Colonial historiography on Burma has thus tended to view Chinese migration into 
Burma as emanating from the northeast, out of Yunnan, and has portrayed Chinese 
migrants there as forming a homogenous "Chinese" ethnic group. This view is to be 
found in Arthur Phayre (1883), G.E. Harvey (1925), and even the revisionist Burmese 
historian Maung Htin Aung (1967). Furthermore, this view has found continuity in 
postwar historiography, which has done little to challenge these colonial impressions. In 
British historiography on Burma as well, the Chinese appear only in Burmese history as 
vanguards of Chinese expansion. I would suggest that the central important of trade with 
China in the minds of nineteenth century British administrators in Burma influenced their 
focus on the Chinese in Upper Burma in their historical narratives, to the total exclusion 
of Chinese in Lower Burma. 
 
III 
The Middle Colonial Perspective 
 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the British wanted to establish a base 
from which to exploit the trade potential of western China. This was built upon what 
Warren Walsh (1943) calls the "Yunnan Myth," beginning in the 1860s. According to 
this myth, which in the course of four decades, came to encompass four other Southwest 
Chinese provinces in addition to Yunnan, Southwest China was a region of immense 
wealth only waiting to be exploited by the British or the French, pushing north out of 
Burma and Indochina respectively. After serious exploration during this period, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, however, this myth was revealed as such. This myth 
strongly influenced local British and French colonial officials.  
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It should be noted as well, that this transition in British policy also followed the 
British acquisition of the remainder of Lower Burma in 1852 as a result of the Second 
Anglo-Burmese War (1852-1853). British attention to Burma and within Burma shifted 
away from Tenasserim specifically and focused more upon the Irrawaddy Deltaic portion 
of Lower Burma surrounding Rangoon. Lower Burma became relevant to broader British 
colonial interests in part as a potential conduit for opening up Yunnan to British 
commercial penetration. The view was strengthened although not caused by the fact that  
the upper levels of the colonial administration in Burma had, from the 1840s, shifted 
away from administrators with experience in the Straits Settlements to administrative 
officers who had spent earlier careers in Bengal, as I have mentioned earlier in this paper. 
The perception of China in India had from a much earlier date, been different than it was 
viewed in Tenasserim. For one thing, British possessions in India did not depend upon 
bringing caravans down to connect it to China. For another thing, the British in India had 
from an earlier date considered gaining an outlet for Indian goods in China through 
Yunnan.17 This hope was actually of very old duration for the British colonial 
administration in Bengal. Earlier surveys with this development in mind had already 
taken place.18 It should be noted that in the most of these accounts, and in the two 
examples just mentioned of British interest in connecting India to China through Burma, 
no reference to Tenasserim was made, and there was also no reference to any Chinese 
migrants resident in coastal Burma. 
In any event, the Yunnan myth was important for overall British policy regarding 
China in the late nineteenth century, but it was pivotal for British perceptions of the 
Chinese community in Burma. The emergence of large-scale rice exports via maritime 
routes from the 1850s produced a boom economy in British Burma that should have 
shifted British attention away from the Chinese caravans coming out of Yunnan. Due to 
the Yunnan myth, however, British interest in Burma's overland connections with 
                                                
17 As Dr. C. Williams explained in his 1864 "Memorandum on the Question of British Trade with 
Western China via Burma," [Quote] At the time of first turning my thoughts to a career in Burmah, and 
especially in Upper Burmah, one of the prospects most distinctly in my view, was that of the old route to 
China by the Irrawaddy being re-opened and made available to British commerce . . . [Unquote] (p. 407). 
18 These included the 1848 exploratory mission sent out of Calcutta to Yunnan with the intention of: 
[Quote] showing the great commercial and political importance of the Burmese town of Bhanmo, on the 
Upper Irawady, and the practicability of a direct trade overland between Calcutta and China. [unquote]. 
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Southwestern China was rekindled. Thus, the focus of British colonial interests in Lower 
Burma upon China continued throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century.  
As far as the British in Burma were concerned, the transition from (1) the focus 
on bringing Chinese caravans down to Tenasserim to (2) the goal of gaining access to 
Yunnan for the sake of exploiting Yunnan's local resources can be dated to the early 
1860s, and one of the first major policy statements on the subject was Dr. C. Williams' 
1864 Memorandum. As a result, for nearly seventy years, from the very beginning of 
British interest in bringing Chinese caravans to Tenasserim from the 1830s, up through 
the evolution of the Yunnan Myth, and up until the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the British remained uninterested in local perceptions, either identities or identifications 
of Chinese settlers in Lower Burma.  
It was only when the British were interested in using the Chinese of Lower Burma 
to fit into overall British economic strategies regarding China that attention was 
refocused upon Chinese migrants in Burma. In this case, however, the Chinese in Burma 
were, in fact, considered as one Chinese people and sub-divisions were ignored either as 
unimportant or incompatible with British economic interests in Southwestern China. 
When the Chinese became critical to colonial economic interests, then they did enter the 
state-centred historical narrative, but not as a heterogeneous and local community, 
instead as a singular community connected to China. As Edward Said has explained, 
Europeans essentialized Asia, ordering knowledge in ways that suited their own interests.  
But, as I have tried to indicate, there was just not one "essentialized" Chinese 
identification. Rather different colonial representations of the "Chinese" co-existed, 
interacted, and, most importantly, contradicted each other at different times in different 
contexts. Did British identifications and essentializing of the Chinese, in the present case, 
change in tandem with shifting British economic interests in the region, or in relation to 
developments within China that affected British economic interests? As I have tried to 
explain, I think they did. 19 
                                                
19 But the British also played with identifications of China itself. As R. F. Johnston noted in 1908: 
[Quote] . . . . China is, indeed, rapidly growing to be more than a mere geographical term. The racial 
solidarity that is the underlying cause of her wonderful power of passive resistance shows no signs of 
disintegration at the present time, and it will form the best possible foundation for a new national 
patriotism. Only ten years ago [c. 1898] an English traveller and politician, predicting the partition of 
China, explained that he used the word 'China' only for convenience, for there is really no such thing as 
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Edward H. Parker worked from the opposite direction as Burney had, analyzing 
Chinese materials for what they had to say about the China-Burma relationship.  His  
work, Burma With Special Reference to Her Relations to China (1893), came out a 
decade after the publication of Phayre's magnum opus, The History of Burma (1883). 
Parker summarized and ordered information from Chinese texts on Chinese relations with 
Burma. It became almost a handbook for British officials and historians interested in 
Burma and it, or a precis on Chinese-Burmese relations (Parker, n. d.), also composed by 
Parker, is cited in the bibliographies of all significant histories of Burma until the present 
as the standard reference for the history of the Chinese in Burma (Harvey 1925, 383). 
Relying upon the Chinese state-centred perspective affirmed perspectives developing 
within the ranks of British colonial authorities in Burma. But regarding the local Chinese 
community in Burma itself, there was little British interest.  
 
III 
Late Colonial Perspectives 
 
As British Burma entered the twentieth century, prevailing state-centred 
perspectives were contested by popular impressions of the Chinese in Burma and the 
Chinese.  These perceptions appear to have been there from the beginning, but as local 
histories tend to be integrated into state-centred narratives only when they are relevant to 
the state, they remained local and unnoticed by colonial authorities. There are a number 
of reasons why this change should have occurred. First, the Chinese population in Burma 
increased dramatically from the 1890s to the 1930s and their importance in commercial 
activities and their urban concentration, especially in Rangoon and Mandalay, made them 
much more visible to the British and to growing numbers of Burmese. Second, the 
Chinese migrant population had achieved the critical mass necessary to launch Chinese 
language newspapers, form larger numbers of associations and clubs, and to participate in 
the print literature of the region. Taw Sein Ko, for example, became a contributor to the 
new Overseas Chinese journal, the Straits Chinese Magazine.  Chinese merchants came 
                                                                                                                                            
'China at all'." For such a view there was some excuse at a time when humbled China was lying wounded 
and helpless at the feet of victorious Japan, but few, I fancy, will be inclined to endorse it now" [unquote]. 
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to dominate opium monopolies and thus became not only key figures in public 
proceedings such as the Opium Commission Hearings of the 1890s, but also became, 
when many attempted to circumvent opium monopoly limits on distribution, almost the 
weekly subject of newspaper reports on crime among the "Chinese."  In both situations, 
their dialect associations were noted and published. The Chinese were, in fact, become 
more real, diverse, and, above all, local. 
As a result, a tension in British historiography on Burma in the late colonial 
period emerged. This tension was between those scholars who continued to view the 
Chinese as foreigners, temporary sojourners, much like the British colonials themselves, 
and those who saw the Chinese as local actors in Burmese history.  The former view was 
certainly reflected early twentieth century British historiography on Burma. The best 
example is the colonial historian B. R. Pearn's magnum opus, the History of Rangoon, 
which is so detailed and large that it has been frequently treated as a primary source by 
historians of Southeast Asia. Despite the incredible importance of Chinese merchants and 
Chinatown in the history of Rangoon, there are only two brief references to anything 
Chinese in Rangoon in the volume. Although important in local narratives, and Pearn was 
writing not from the perspective of Rangoon, but rather from the British colonial 
perspective on the place of Rangoon in Burma, the Chinese in Rangoon per se appear to 
have been considered as irrelevant to the overall state-centred historical narrative. 
At the same time, the other trend involved in the former view, was to emphasize 
the historical relationship between the Burmese and Chinese courts. The Chinese 
invasion of Burma in the late thirteenth century has probably received more attention in 
the late colonial historiography than any other single event involving the Chinese in 
Burma, at least for the pre-1940 period (For this literature see Huber 1909, 648-655, 659-
680). The significance of this invasion and what role it may or may not have played in the 
decline and ultimate demise of the Pagan kingdom is still a matter of debate (Aung-
Thwin 1998), although it is best seen as one (and an external one at that) of a number of 
factors that together were at fault. A second area of chief interest regarding the Chinese in 
Burma is for a series of four Chinese invasions of Upper Burma in the eighteenth century, 
all of which were beaten by Burmese armies (Luce 1925; Barretto 1930b; Lieberman 
1986: 224, 226-7, 247, 269).  
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The latter view was slow in emerging, but creeped into historical narratives 
through a variety of mediums. British newspapers in Rangoon, such as the Rangoon 
Gazette, introduced many Burmese and British settlers to the active efforts of local 
Chinese to support their communities, and these communities were clearly divided along 
dialect lines.20  Attention to the Chinese in Burma as a local community was also 
reinforced by British travelogues of the 1920s and 1930s, even earlier, by authors of wide 
experience in other areas of Southeast Asia, especially the Straits.   
More importantly, as the Chinese communities in Burma grew, prospered, and 
became more sedentary, the self-promotion of special cultural activities, the construction 
of community-specific temples, and the establishment of dialect associations made more 
obvious what I see the "Chinese internal view" of themselves.  Dialects, as opposed to 
standard Mandarin, remained dominant; even the leading Sino-Burmese colonial 
administrator of the late nineteenth century, Taw Sein Ko, had to be sent at government 
expense to Peking to learn Mandarin. And Chinese nationalists came to Burma to 
promote their cause of a unified Chinese Republic and a single Chinese national they 
were met solely by their dialect counterparts in Rangoon. This internal view has been 
long-term among the Chinese in Burma, as I found in my some of my interviews with 
Chinese in Rangoon and Mandalay in the last two years.21 Oral interviews suggested that 
the Chinese in Rangoon see themselves, both in the present and in the past, in ways 
similar to those of Chinese communities in Penang and Singapore, divided into 
associations and with diverse origins in Southeastern China and, among the Chinese in 
Rangoon, with few connections to the Chinese from Yunnan. The center of Chinatown, 
for example, is still essentially divided into two blocks, the Gwangdong and the Hokkien 
sides of the street. Dialect associations still form the basic centers for community 
functions, and, aside from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, no blanket Chinese 
organization exists for Chinese community-wide activities or interaction.22 According to 
                                                
20 Rangoon's "Chinatown" was then, as it is today, split into Gwangdong and Hokkien blocks. 
21The author conducted fieldwork in Burma in May 1999,  January 2000,  and December 2000. At 
the time of this writing, the author is preparing for another fieldtrip to Burma in July 2001. 
22 Two other recent explorations of Chinese society in Burma, for example, have found that the 
oral histories of the Chinese in Burma and their present-day perspectives are very similar to those prevalent 
among the Chinese in the Straits. Mya Than, in an article on the Chinese in 1990s Burma published in 
1997, has offered the first publication as far as I am aware that has identified differences in Chinese 
identities and identifications of Burma as highly relevant aspects of the Chinese community in Rangoon 
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one septagenerian Chinese resident who had lived his entire life in Burma, prior to the 
Second World War, the Chinese in Rangoon, who had no problems intermarrying with 
Burmans, Karens, and Mons, would not even marry across dialect lines among the 
Chinese.23 Despite the longevity of this Chinese internal view, its existence has really 
only entered into the historiography in the last five years or so.  We do know that despite 
developments that promoted a national Chinese identity overseas since the 1910s, 
including the Chinese Revolution, the Second World War, the establishment of the PRC 
and the Cultural Revolution, this internal view remains strong among the Chinese in 
Burma even today.   
This perspective of the varied Chinese communities, instead of a single Chinese 
national identity, also emerges in the Burmese local-centred narrative. The average 
Burmese did not come into contact with Chinese embassies or even Chinese armies on a 
regular basis. Few Burmese likely ever went to any major Chinese city prior to the 
nineteenth century. At the same time, many average Burmese lived on a daily basis in the 
proximity of Chinese communities, interacted with them, and did notice that Chinese 
were not a uniform group, nor did they form a single identity. Unlike the state-centred 
narrative then, local narratives and popular impressions saw a much more heterogeneous 
Chinese population. We know, for example, that locally-derived information from the 
early seventeenth century that was then incorporated into some of the state-centred 
narratives, identified certain groups from China by non-Chinese identifications, such as 
in the late sixteenth century information that slipped out of Toungoo about the situation 
of Muslim Panthee traders and was included in U Kala's early eighteenth century Maha 
Yazawin-Kyi (Kala 1730). Aside from such written evidence, popular oral traditions 
divided the Chinese of Burma into different groups. However, these distinctions do not 
appear to be consciously sub-ethnic. Rather, Burmese popular traditions saw two chief 
                                                                                                                                            
and both their external and internal identities and identifications. But his purpose in the article was to 
discuss the economic role and contemporary data regarding the Chinese in Burma and not to interogate 
these identities and identifications, discuss their origins, or put them into a broader and dynamic historical 
context.   Jocelyn Co Thein (1997) has also found similar divisions in her research in the same community. 
However, as her work is focused upon the 1967 anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon and this Chinese community 
in the 1980s and 1990s, her interests have been focused on contemporary continuities rather than 
historiographical differences. She has also found some of the same divisions in the Chinese community 
there today. 
23 Other evidence suggests that this was generally the case, although we do know of exceptions, as 
in the case of Haw Boon Par, a Hakka, who married a Gwangdong in Rangoon.  
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groups of Chinese in Burma:  (1) The "short-sleeves" referring to carpenters and coolies 
and almost always to Gwangdong and (2) the "long-sleeves," referring to merchants and 
moneylenders, and almost always to the Hokkien. As these two occupational groups lived 
in divided blocks of Rangoon from the nineteenth century, they were seen as forming two 
different Chinese communities; not Hokkien and Gwangdong, perhaps, but the division 
among the Chinese migrants was clearly perceived.  
Other self-perceptions among the Chinese are always in the making. In my 
interviews among the Chinese in Rangoon, for example, I found that the Chinese there 
had begun to see themselves, Gwangdong, Hokkien and otherwise, as a single migrant 
Chinese group characterized by sub-ethnic diversity, separately from the Chinese 
communities in Mandalay and elsewhere in Upper Burma, whom they view as rich and 
criminal as opposed to themselves who are poor and peaceful. Another interviewee also 
saw a similar divide, but couched it in different terms, splitting the Chinese into 
"noodleshop" (local) Chinese and "diplomat" (PRC) Chinese. Likewise, World War II 
and the PRC's emergence did more than bond the Chinese together as "Chinese," it also 
created a new division along political lines. Perceptions of the Chinese in Burma as 
"White Chinese" and those of the PRC as "Red Chinese," as just one example, are 
commonly voiced by the Chinese in Burma today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, my argument here is that historiography on the Chinese in Burma has, 
since the 1820s, relied heavily on three different but mutually-reinforcing state-centred 
historical narratives (British, Burmese, and Chinese) to the neglect of local historical 
narratives, particularly those of the Chinese migrants themselves or of local Burmese. 
The reliance of historians upon textual sources at the centre, and state documents and 
interests, has played a significant role in influencing the perceptions of the Chinese in 
Burma both in the past and in the present. These sources do not provide a balanced 
representation of local and non-local perspectives, but rather the shifting focus of colonial 
administrators as their interests changed. As Duara has explained, in reference to the 
tensions between state-centred and local historical narratives, "the powerful repressive 
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and appropriative functions of national History need to be continually challenged." I 
think that in the present case as well, when we consider the Chinese in Burma, the 
impressions locked into colonial and Burmese state documentation need to be challenged 
and that we should take into consideration not just sources reflective of British colonial 
interests or the impressions of the Burmese royal courts, the external views, but also local 
perspectives, the internal view, of the Chinese in Burma. 
In short, when researchers have depended upon either British or Burmese state-
centred documents and historical narratives, they get a picture of a homogeneous Chinese 
national community in Burma. Researchers who focus on local source materials and local 
historical narratives have found a different picture of the Chinese in Burma, one that 
emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of the Chinese community, or, more accurately, the 
co-existence of different Chinese communities in Burma. There is thus a tension between 
the Burmese and the British state-centred approaches, or external view of the Chinese in 
Burma, and the local approach of recent researchers, who take into consideration internal 
views of the Chinese in Burma. 
General British approaches to the Chinese in Burma appear to have changed 
several times throughout colonial rule. At several key junctures, British colonial interests 
shifted their emphases between local and non-local perspectives. In some cases, this 
agreed with Burmese indigenous historiography, in some cases not. But whether in 
agreement or not, it is my argument that the tensions between local and non-local 
perspectives in Burma have had an enormous impact upon the perceptions of the Chinese 
in colonial and postcolonial historiography in Burma. To generalize the issue, I suggest  
that this may be one answer or part of the answer for different perceptions of the Chinese 
in Burma and the Straits in colonial and post-colonial historiography.  
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